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abstract.  Accomplice liability makes someone guilty of a crime he never committed, so 
long as he helped or influenced the perpetrator and did so with the required mens rea. Just what 
that mens rea should be has been contested for more than a century. Here I consider three major 
approaches and find them all wanting. I propose rejecting their common (but rarely questioned) 
assumption that what matters is the helper’s mental state toward the perpetrator’s commission 
of an offense. I suggest considering instead his stance toward the perpetrator’s intention to act: a 
helper is an accomplice, on this view, if he (a) intends to see to it that the principal form or keep 
his own plan to commit an offense and (b) does not intend or expect that plan’s frustration. This 
standard better justifies imposing accomplice liability. It more precisely picks out those helpers 
culpable for the perpetrator’s very offense. And this parity of guilt is the best—perhaps the only 
good—basis for imposing the same liability on accomplice and principal, in a system so 
retribution-driven as to choose to do so at all. 
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introduction 
Accomplice liability poses an enduring puzzle. It invites the state to convict 
people of crimes they did not commit. Across the United States, a person can 
be convicted of grand larceny without pilfering a dime and jailed for first-
degree murder without drawing a drop of blood. This might seem like a gross 
miscarriage of justice, but it is black-letter law: anyone deemed an 
“accomplice” to a crime can be convicted of it as if he had perpetrated  
it himself.1 
What is the moral logic of a law by which one person can be convicted of 
another’s crime—simply for lifting a finger to help him, or for offering an 
encouraging word? Unsurprisingly, this question has beset courts and 
commentators for more than a century. Especially controversial is the proper 
mens rea standard for complicity: Say Cassius helps or encourages Brutus to 
murder Caesar. Before the law holds Cassius liable as Brutus’s accomplice, 
what attitude should it require him to have toward Brutus’s lethal act, or some 
aspect of it? 
In this Note, I defend a new answer. After tracing accomplice liability’s 
broad outlines in Part I, I discuss in Part II three prominent contenders for its 
mens rea requirement. First, some laws require just that the accomplice know 
that his action will help the principal commit the crime. Second, others require 
that the accomplice intend to promote the principal’s act. Neither has achieved 
a steady victory in law:  
[I]s simple knowledge enough? Yes, said the Supreme Court in . . . 
1870; no, said Judge Learned Hand in Peoni in 1938; yes, implied the 
Supreme Court in 1947; no, said the Supreme Court in 1949; yes, if it is 
accompanied by an act that substantially facilitates the commission of 
the underlying offense, said the Supreme Court in 1961; usually, said 
                                                                                                                      
1. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2012) (“Whoever commits an offense against the United States or 
aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a 
principal.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 777.011 (West 2013) (“Whoever . . . aids, abets, counsels, 
hires, or otherwise procures [an] offense to be committed, and such offense is committed or 
is attempted to be committed, is a principal in the first degree and may be charged, 
convicted, and punished as such, whether he or she is or is not actually or constructively 
present at the commission of such offense.”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-302 (2011) (making 
someone liable for another’s conduct when “either before or during the commission of an 
offense with the purpose to promote or facilitate the commission, the person solicits,  
aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid the other person in the planning or commission of  
the offense”). 
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the Second Circuit in 1962; only if knowledge is enough for the 
underlying offense, said the Second Circuit in another case in 1962; 
sometimes, said the Seventh Circuit in 1985; always, implied the 
Seventh Circuit in 1995; no, said the Second Circuit in 1995 and the 
Seventh Circuit in 1998.2  
And finally, Gideon Yaffe has proposed another standard to resolve this contest 
between knowledge and purpose: the accomplice must intend that the 
principal commit the crime, but this intention need not dispose him to promote 
the principal’s crime. I argue against all three proposals.  
In Part III, I offer a new one. The options canvassed in Part II assume that 
what matters is the accomplice’s mental state with respect to the principal’s 
commission of the crime. I would scrap this premise. What should make 
someone an accomplice, I argue, is his stance toward the principal’s intention to 
commit the offense. To be an accomplice, one must intend that someone else 
form (or keep) his own plan to commit a crime, without expecting or intending 
for that plan to be frustrated.3 This standard more precisely matches the kind 
of investment that might make accomplices of mere helpers. In this and other 
ways, as I show in Part IV, it better justifies important features of complicity 
law. I address objections in Part V. 
What I do not build is a ground-up defense of having accomplice liability. 
Any such grand theory must rest on a theory of punishment: Where liability 
should be imposed depends on where punishment is justified. So whether we 
should have accomplice liability depends on how it would serve the justifying 
goals of the criminal justice system—be they deterrence, rehabilitation, 
retribution, some combination of these, or other aims entirely. Is deterrence 
the main or only licit point of fining and jailing? Then accomplice liability as 
we know it should be retired: convicting helpers even when they causally 
contribute nothing to a crime, as our law does,4 is hardly the most efficient way 
to minimize the amount of blood spilled and money embezzled. By contrast, 
the more one cares about rehabilitation, the more one will want the criminal 
law to bring into its curative sweep anyone who has certain attitudes toward 
crime and its harms, as accomplice liability largely does.  
                                                                                                                      
2. Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider and Abettor and the 
Causer Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341, 1351-52 (2002) (footnotes omitted). 
3. Here I use “plan” as synonymous with “intention.” On understanding intentions as plans, 
see infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra Part I. 
  
the yale law journal 123: 460    20 13  
464 
 
For the retributivist, finally, punishment must contribute to justice. And it 
does that only when the punished deserve it, when they are sufficiently 
culpable.5 On this view, a criminal’s choice to disrupt social order, callous to its 
value, does not just cause the injustice set right by law. For retributivists, 
rather, a guilty mind partly constitutes that injustice. This view need not require 
banning pure mental states.6 The point is that a criminal’s will to exercise more 
than his fair share of liberty—his insensitivity to the reasons for obeying some 
law—is part of the harm that punishment (which limits liberty) is meant to 
correct. Without this culpability, this disregard of reasons, harmful behavior is 
not the sort of social ill that normally justifies punishment. In short, a guilty 
mind—expressed in conduct—involves an arrogation of freedom beyond the 
law’s reasoned bounds, an arrogation central to the retributivist basis for 
punishment.7 Retributivist theories will therefore be most congenial to 
accomplice liability, and to my proposal for its mens rea standard: both 
concentrate on culpability in justifying liability schemes.8 
It is not my purpose to argue that our law does or should forge such tight 
links between punishment and blameworthiness, much less that it should do 
so by the peculiar tool of accomplice liability. What I aim to offer is the best 
mens rea standard for such liability, given its practice of convicting a helper for 
another’s crimes, whether or not his help did actual harm. In other words, this 
Note will assume that accomplice liability (in that sense) is worth having—and 
hence that liability should closely track culpability.9 With these points fixed, it 
                                                                                                                      
5. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) (“The heart of the retribution rationale is that a 
criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal 
offender.”). 
6. See infra Section V.C. 
7. For a brief sketch of one theory of retribution, see JOHN FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS 
128-30 (1983); and JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 262-64 (2d ed. 2011). 
8. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 13.2(f), at 683 (4th ed. 2003) (“Under the 
general principles applicable to accomplice liability, there is no such thing as liability 
without fault.”). For a brief discussion of how retributivism might acknowledge factors 
besides culpability in fixing punishment, see infra Section V.C.  
9. That does not mean that this Note should interest only retributivists. One could, for 
example, have a hybrid view, on which punishment is justified only if the defendant 
deserves it and certain other conditions are met. See generally NORVAL MORRIS, THE 
HABITUAL CRIMINAL 8-20 (1951) (outlining this and other views). My proposal could then 
appeal as a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for finding complicity—that is, as an 
account of the mental state that makes someone deserving of the punishment imposed upon 
the principal. Finally, one theorist’s defense is another’s reductio; those who reject 
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will address several questions: What mens rea would make the helper’s 
culpability so much like the principal’s that we could licitly convict both of the 
same crime? How well does this standard make sense of the doctrine? Which 
details would it suggest refining? And how does it fare against criticisms 
arising from within the same culpability-centered framework? 
i .   overview of accomplice liability 
The doctrine of complicity makes a person “legally accountable for the 
conduct of another person.”10 A convicted accomplice to murder is, then, a 
convicted murderer, just like the principal (or perpetrator). These are two 
routes to the same criminal conviction, status, and range of punishments—to 
liability for the same offense. In a landmark case on complicity, United States v. 
Peoni,11 Judge Learned Hand quoted ancient authorities to the effect that “the 
law of homicide is quite wide enough to comprise . . . those who have 
‘procured, counseled, commanded, or abetted’ the felony . . . ‘for it is 
colloquially said that he sufficiently kills who advises’ . . . the killing.”12 
Convicting an accomplice naturally requires inquiry into mens rea and actus 
reus. But the actus reus bar is set remarkably low. It is cleared by any words or 
behavior that count as aiding the principal (e.g., handing a murderer a gun), or 
influencing him (e.g., advising or inciting him to kill).13 The helper’s conduct 
need not be the but-for cause of the principal’s offense.14 With striking 
capaciousness, the law (in the words of one commentator) requires only that it 
“could have contributed to the criminal action of the principal,” and that 
                                                                                                                      
retributivism wholesale might use this Note’s elaboration of some of its striking 
implications to bolster a case against it.   
10. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(2) (Official Draft 1985). 
11. 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938). 
12. Id. at 402 (citations omitted) (quoting 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK WILLIAM 
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 507 (1895)). 
13. In this respect, the federal standard is typical: it holds fully liable for an offense anyone who 
“aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) 
(2012).  
14. See LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 13.2(b), at 673-75; see also State ex rel. Martin v. Tally, 15 So. 722, 
739 (Ala. 1894) (“If the aid in homicide can be shown to have put the deceased at a 
disadvantage, to have deprived him of a single chance of life which but for it he would have 
had, he who furnishes such aid is guilty, though it cannot be known or shown that the dead 
man, in the absence thereof, would have availed himself of that chance.”). 
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“without the [helper’s] influence or aid, it is possible that the principal would 
not have acted as he did.”15  
The standard for finding that one person has influenced another (e.g., that 
Cassius influenced Brutus in killing) thus differs from the standard for finding 
that one event has caused another (e.g., that a stabbing caused Caesar’s 
death).16 What accomplice liability requires, again, is not causing the principal 
to act, but saying or doing something that could have done so. Cassius must 
have encouraged or helped Brutus to kill Caesar. But it doesn’t matter if Brutus 
would have acted just the same way even without Cassius’s input. So one can 
meet the actus reus requirement even by minimally effective help (at common 
law)17 or mere attempts at help (under the Model Penal Code)—whether or not 
the help does any harm, and whatever its other features.18 
Compensating for such a vast conduct element is a more stringent mens rea 
requirement. And here is where the controversy arises in federal and state 
law.19 Which of the accomplice’s attitudes matters—his stance toward the 
perpetrator, toward the perpetrator’s act, or toward something else? And 
whatever its object, what must the content of that attitude or stance be?  
To make this more concrete, suppose Cassius hands Brutus the knife by 
which Brutus kills Caesar. Several aspects of Cassius’s mental state might seem 
relevant to whether he is complicit in the crime. In particular, we might inquire 
into his mental state regarding each of (A) his own conduct, (B) Brutus’s lethal 
                                                                                                                      
15. Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 
CALIF. L. REV. 323, 359 (1985). 
16. See H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 41-44, 51-59 (2d ed. 1985).  
17. See, e.g., People v. Hughes, 161 P.2d 285, 286 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1945) (imposing liability 
on a defendant who “stood a few feet away [from a robbery] and did nothing other than to 
serve as a lookout for his associate”). 
18. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)(ii) (Official Draft 1985). 
19. See generally Sanford H. Kadish, Reckless Complicity, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 369 
(1997) (discussing why the law requires that the accomplice have intentionally aided the 
principal’s commission of the crime); Audrey Rogers, Accomplice Liability for Unintentional 
Crimes: Remaining Within the Constraints of Intent, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1351 (1998) 
(discussing the appropriate scope of accomplice liability for unintentional crimes); Robert 
Weisberg, Reappraising Complicity, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 217, 236-47 (2000) (outlining the 
debate over whether the required mens rea for accomplice liability should be knowledge or 
purpose); Weiss, supra note 2, at 1345-46 (noting that in the federal law of aiding and 
abetting, there is no clear resolution to the question of whether intent or knowledge is the 
required mens rea); Grace E. Mueller, Note, The Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability, 61 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 2169, 2172-74 (1988) (comparing theories of the mens rea for complicity and arguing 
that the accomplice should possess the full mens rea required of the perpetrator).  
  
the mens rea of accomplice liability 
467 
 
act (or its actus reus or mens rea component), and (C) the circumstances or 
results of Brutus’s act.20 Although all three dimensions are relevant to 
complicity, the first and third have posed much less difficulty and can be 
resolved by stipulation here. 
First, as for (A), Cassius’s mental state in performing his own conduct of 
aid or influence, I will assume that to be complicit, Cassius must have acted 
“volitionally, deliberately, and intentionally rather than by mistake or 
accident.”21 This is a modest rule, requiring only that Cassius be aware and in 
control of what he does. 
As for (C), the circumstances or results of the principal’s act, I assume with 
the Model Penal Code that an accomplice must have the same mental state 
regarding these elements of a crime as the principal. To be liable for first-
degree murder, for example, both Cassius and Brutus must specifically intend 
the lethal result.22  
Here I focus on (B), the most burning of these questions23: to count 
Cassius as an accomplice, what mental state should the law require of him 
toward Brutus’s act (or toward its conduct or mental-state elements)?24 I 
consider two options vying for dominance in the cases, and then Gideon 
Yaffe’s proposal; assessing these will suggest, and support, my own.  
                                                                                                                      
20. See LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 13.2(b), at 675 (offering some of these mental states, or a 
combination of them, as candidate standards for the mens rea of complicity). 
21. Weiss, supra note 2, at 1348. 
22. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:8(IV) (2007) (establishing accomplice liability for 
“act[ing] purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently with respect to [a] result, as 
required for the commission of the offense”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(4) (Official Draft 
1985) (establishing accomplice liability “if [the defendant] acts with the kind of culpability 
 . . . that is sufficient for the commission of the offense”). In fact, the Code is more 
ambiguous on the circumstance element than on the result; for simplicity, I stipulate the 
same standard for both. 
23. See, e.g., Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. 342, 347-48 (1870) (citing cases for and against the 
sufficiency of knowledge for complicity); United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 797-98 
(7th Cir. 1985) (summarizing the history of the “knowledge versus purposeful intent” 
debate); Weisberg, supra note 19, at 236 (“For decades, the American courts and legislatures 
have debated whether knowledge or ‘true purpose’ should be the required mens rea for 
accomplice liability.”).  
24. As I use them from now on, “the mens rea of accomplice liability” and synonymous terms 
refer to these aspects of the mental state required for grounding accomplice liability, and not 
to those labeled (A) or (C). 
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i i .  three prior proposals 
A.  Historical Approaches 
In this Section, I consider two criteria for the mens rea of complicity—
knowledge and purpose—and find them, respectively, too wide and too 
narrow. 
By some federal and state authorities on the complicity mens rea, a helper 
need not intend that the principal commit his crime. It is enough that he know 
that the principal will commit it. Thus, the Fourth Circuit held in Backun v. 
United States, someone who sells something aware that it will be put to 
felonious use can be counted an accomplice in felony just because “he could 
refuse to give the assistance by refusing to make the sale.”25 That court cited 
another case holding that “one who knowingly delivers supplies to [an 
unlawful] distillery” should be liable for offenses committed there.26 Several 
state statutes include similarly low mens rea requirements.27 
Imagine that Cassius (who has recently taken a job as a cashier in a Roman 
department store) has reason to believe that Brutus will use the hammer he is 
about to buy from Cassius to break into Caesar’s palace.28 Cassius-the-cashier 
does not intend for Brutus to use the hammer that way; he sells it to him just 
to please his snippy supervisor, Jupiter. Now Cassius may be morally to  
blame. Perhaps he should be liable for a separate offense, like knowingly 
contributing to a violent act. But it seems wrong to hold him liable for 
breaking and entering.29 
                                                                                                                      
25. 112 F.2d 635, 637 (4th Cir. 1940).  
26. Vukich v. United States, 28 F.2d 666, 669 (9th Cir. 1928) (emphasis added). 
27. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-2-4 (LexisNexis 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-201(a) 
(2013). 
28. For a case involving similar facts, see People v. Lauria, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628, 634 (Ct. App. 1967) 
(“[W]e think the operator of a telephone answering service with positive knowledge that 
this service was being used to facilitate the extortion of ransom, the distribution of heroin, 
or the passing of counterfeit money who continued to furnish the service with knowledge of 
its use, might be chargeable on knowledge alone with participation in a scheme to extort 
money, to distribute narcotics, or to pass counterfeit money.”). 
29. For different approaches to this question in case law regarding conspiracy offenses, compare 
United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205 (1940) (finding purveyors of sugar and yeast not to  
have participated in buyers’ moonshining), with Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319  
U.S. 703 (1943) (finding a wholesaler guilty for selling drugs to a physician who supplied 
them to addicts).  
  
the mens rea of accomplice liability 
469 
 
First, his connection to that crime is quite weak. At least someone who 
intends an end will, if he is rational, stand ready to promote it by some  
means, and to adjust that means to changing circumstances. One cannot intend 
something without being somewhat disposed to promote it. But in making  
the sale, Cassius does not intend the break-in. He is not at all disposed  
to promote it. He is just aware of being (by his sale) one strand in a causal 
thread leading to it. 
But second, and more generally: Since most of us are nodes in a tightly 
packed web of social influence, which may include many (at least minor) 
offenses, this knowledge standard would cast too broad a net. It would limit 
not just sales, but a wide range of everyday actions “if we had to fear criminal 
liability for what others might do simply because our actions made their acts 
more probable” and we were in a position to know so.30 So the knowledge 
standard catches more cases than it should.31 
Consider now the purpose criterion, which also finds support in federal 
and state case law.32 What if Cassius hands Brutus a knife in order to help him 
carry out his (Brutus’s) plan to fell Caesar? Now the assassination is among 
Cassius’s reasons for helping Brutus. And again, rational agents will be to some 
extent33 disposed to promote what they intend. So Cassius is rationally 
disposed to promote the murder by Brutus. His intention would give him 
some inclination to see to it that Brutus killed Caesar. If the knife proved too 
dull, Cassius might hand Brutus a sword; if another senator grabbed the 
sword, Cassius might slip Brutus a vial of poison; and so on. Whatever the 
new circumstances, Cassius will be at least somewhat disposed to ensure that 
Brutus overcomes them to kill Caesar.  
But as this example suggests, requiring Cassius to be so heavily invested 
sets the complicity bar too high. It should not be necessary for complicity that 
                                                                                                                      
30. Kadish, supra note 15, at 353. 
31. For further discussion, see Gideon Yaffe, Intending to Aid, LAW & PHIL., Dec. 2012, 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10982-012-9168-8. 
32. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-302(3) (2007) (imposing accomplice liability on one who 
acts “with the purpose to promote or facilitate the commission” of an offense); United 
States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938) (holding that accomplice liability requires 
that the defendant “participate in [the crime] as something that he wishes to bring about, 
that he seek by his action to make it succeed”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (Official Draft 
1985) (imposing accomplice liability on a person who, among other things, acts “with the 
purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense”). 
33. I say “to some extent” because a countervailing factor might ultimately lead them to do 
otherwise. 
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one intend the aided crime’s commission. By this rule, some whom we should 
count as accomplices would go free. The driver of a getaway car (or chariot) is 
one example.34 Even if the driver for someone else’s burglary is paid up-front, 
and is therefore indifferent to whether the burglary occurs, we should  
count him an accomplice. If the knowledge standard is too harsh, purpose is 
too lenient. 
B.  A Recent Proposal: Splitting Intentions 
Because of where these two approaches lead, Gideon Yaffe’s project has 
been to negotiate between them. But to see his middle way, we need some 
background.  
According to Yaffe and other philosophers of action, intentions give rise to 
two kinds of rational inclinations or dispositions. They do not just dispose us 
to promote what we intend. They also put us under rational pressure not to 
reconsider our intentions—not to change our minds—based on data we had all 
along. Intentions, that is, have motion and momentum. They move us toward 
an end, and give us reason not to change our minds about it absent new 
information. 
Yaffe tries to exploit this dual nature of intentions to find a mens rea 
standard between knowledge and ordinary, fully committed intentions. On his 
view, briefly, the required mens rea should be a special kind of intention to 
aid—one that grounds the second but not the first inclination just described. 
An accomplice’s intention, that is, need not dispose him to promote the crime he 
knowingly helped, but it must dispose him not to reconsider his help in light of 
its link to the crime. Here I elaborate on this proposal and raise objections to it. 
1.  Splitting Intentions 
It is worth describing in more detail how Yaffe and other philosophers of 
action think intentions normally work. 
                                                                                                                      
34. See, e.g., United States v. McNeil, 106 F. App’x 294, 301 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
evidence that the defendant, as getaway driver for a robbery, “communicated extensively 
with” the robbers was enough to make him an accomplice rather than someone 
“substantially less culpable than the average participant” (internal citation omitted)); People 
v. Jackson, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978) (“[E]vidence sustains the jury’s verdict that the 
defendant was guilty of being an accomplice to the robbery by reason of his knowing 
participation as the driver of the getaway car.”).  
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Again, an example will help. Say Cassius-the-cashier decides to sell the 
hammer to Brutus to aid the break-in. By Yaffe’s lights, Cassius will thus incur 
some reason (and become disposed) to do two things: 
1.   Take the steps necessary to promote Brutus’s break-in by getting 
him the hammer. 
2.   Not reconsider selling Brutus the hammer in light of the fact, already 
considered, that the hammer will be so used. 
In other words, Cassius will—if he is rational—abide by (1) and (2), absent 
stronger contrary reasons. He will adopt the means necessary to promoting his 
end, and avoid reconsidering that end in light of facts about it that he already 
considered in forming his intention. I will call (1) the “Means Norm” and (2) 
the “Non-Reconsideration Norm.”  
Of course, Cassius-the-cashier can still change his mind, or new relevant 
factors may arise. Intentions can be revised. But part of being a rational agent 
means being somewhat disposed to promote what one intends. It means 
treating one’s intentions as points of deliberation that are more fixed 
(assuming that information holds constant) than options that one considered 
but never formed intentions to pursue. Otherwise, intentions would play no 
useful role in one’s life or action. They would settle nothing. At every moment, 
one would have to reconsider anew all the options and their merits. To play 
their proper role, then, intentions must be paid some deference and must help 
organize other choices. That is why, for Yaffe, intentions will typically give rise 
to the Means Norm and Non-Reconsideration Norm. 
I say “typically” because Yaffe’s proposal for the complicity mens rea drives 
a wedge between the purpose and the knowledge criteria by chipping away at 
one of these ordinary effects of intending. For Cassius-the-cashier to satisfy 
Yaffe’s proposed mens rea, he must intend the sale to aid the break-in. But this 
need not dispose him to promote the break-in, only to avoid changing his mind 
about the sale on account of its connection to the break-in. 
For Yaffe, in other words, the cashier must form an intention (to sell in aid 
of the break-in), but one of an unusual sort. This intention needn’t ground the 
Means Norm and the Non-Reconsideration Norm, but only the latter. That is 
how Yaffe makes space between the knowledge and purpose criteria. It is how 
he would cover the getaway (chariot) driver in our burglary example. The 
driver, Yaffe thinks, would be disposed not to change his mind on account of 
the burglary even if he is not quite inclined to promote it. In general, Yaffe 
means this standard to cover helpers who intend that the principal commit his 
crime but who are not thereby disposed to promote it.  
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2.  Objections 
The problem is that the criteria just described may be impossible to satisfy. 
Doesn’t having an intention necessarily incline us to promote its contents?35 
What could it mean to intend what we are not at all disposed to advance? In 
particular, how could a detail about a goal make its way into the content of our 
intention, without becoming part of what we are thereby disposed to promote? 
Intentions and their practical implications, after all, are fixed not just by 
what they refer to, but by how they refer to it. Intending to sell the hammer to 
someone who will use it in a break-in, and intending to sell the hammer to the 
customer who asks for it, are different intentions. As new data come in, a cashier 
who has the first intention will be disposed to act differently from one who has 
the second. Each will be adjusting to promote different ends: either facilitation 
of a break-in, or simply selling to those who ask. Only a cashier with the first 
intention will be disposed to prefer criminal customers to law-abiding ones, to 
encourage stoutheartedness in nervous neophytes at crime, and so on.  
Not necessarily, Yaffe says.36 A cashier could form the first intention but be 
disposed to promote just the same outcomes as if he had formed the second. 
He could have the first intention and not be disposed to ensure the break-in 
occurs. But then what is the reference to “who will use it to break into a house” 
doing in the first intention? How does it differentiate the first intention from 
the second, as it must for Yaffe’s proposal not to collapse into the purpose 
criterion?  
In general, that is, what is the difference between  
1.   an intention to do simply X, formed by one who knows that X is P 
(what I will call a “simply X intention”), and 
2.   an intention to do X-which-is-P (a “compound X-P intention”), 
in cases where (Yaffe thinks37) both dispose the agent to promote only X? 
 It can’t be that only the compound X-P intention disposes the agent 
against changing his mind in light of X’s being P. The reason is that Yaffe 
thinks the same could be true of a simply X intention—if the agent forming 
it had considered that X is P, but without including P in his intention.  
                                                                                                                      
35. See, e.g., MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON 18-20 (1987) 
(defending a definition of intention that has just this implication).  
36. Yaffe, supra note 31, at 14-18. 
37. Yaffe, supra note 31.  
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But this only deepens the puzzle of what it means for our intentions to 
include something without disposing us to promoting it. If this mere 
incorporation can’t be picked out by how it affects our acts or dispositions, 
how can we get a grip on it? Can we define it as the only basis—besides 
considering a certain belief at a certain point in deliberation—for a Non-
Reconsideration Norm? That is little help. 
Yaffe makes further attempts to justify this distinction, which I think fail 
for reasons that would take us too far afield. More relevant is why his search for 
a new complicity standard might have led to this approach. In particular, Yaffe 
might be moved toward this idiosyncratic, even hair-splitting sense of 
intention—stronger than knowledge, weaker than “ordinary” intention—by an 
assumption pervasive in the literature and law on complicity. That assumption 
holds that what matters is the helper’s mental state regarding the principal’s 
commission of the crime. Given the historic standoff over complicity, it may be 
time to question the premise. In the next Part, I make a proposal that scraps it. 
i i i .  a new way forward 
A.  Proposal 
Based on Section II.A, we can plot discrete examples of when, intuitively, 
there is or isn’t accomplice liability, so that we can begin to trace a line of  
best fit: 
1.   Not accomplice liability: Cassius-the-cashier sells Brutus a hammer 
believing but not intending that Brutus will use it to break in to 
Caesar’s palace (“cashier case”).38 
2.   Accomplice liability: Cassius knowingly drives the getaway chariot 
for Brutus’s burglary of Caesar’s palace but achieves his end 
(payment) up-front, hence regardless of whether Brutus actually 
burgles, and hence (we can stipulate) without intending that 
Brutus do so (“getaway case”). 
                                                                                                                      
38. Though I will refer below to this particular example for readability, it stands for all cases 
where the helper knows but does not intend that the crime will occur. For exemplary cases 
and analysis, see supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text. Moreover, I will use the term 
“break in” here and the substantively similar “burglary” in the second example to ensure 
that our different intuitions about them are responding just to the subtle differences 
between Cassius’s stances toward each, while the different names may help to keep them 
separate in the reader’s mind.  
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3.   Accomplice liability: Cassius gives Brutus a knife intending that 
Brutus use it to kill Caesar (“knife case”).39 
Note two things. First, to find a candidate standard for the mens rea of 
complicity that lies between the requirements judged too high (purpose) and 
too low (knowledge), we should consider what the knife and getaway cases 
have in common that the cashier case lacks. And since the common feature will 
have to justify potentially subjecting Cassius to the same punishment (for the 
same act) as Brutus, it should pertain to what makes Brutus himself 
blameworthy: his own guilty mind, or mens rea.40 
At a first pass, what seems to make an accomplice is the helper’s investment 
in another’s injustice. Investment suggests standing to benefit. But that can’t 
be the whole of it. Otherwise, Brutus could make Cassius-the-cashier an 
accomplice just by planning, without input from him, to bring him back loot 
from Caesar’s palace. Investment in this context, then, must (also) suggest 
readiness to support or promote. But support or promote what? 
It can’t just be Brutus’s act. That would yield the right results in the cashier 
and knife cases, but not in the getaway case, where Cassius is not invested in 
Brutus’s act. Yet he does seem invested in Brutus’s own intention to burgle. If 
that were lacking, Brutus would need no getaway, and Cassius would miss out 
on the money he seeks. So we can infer that Cassius at some point stands ready 
to promote Brutus’s intention—to get him to stick to the plan, if he starts  
to waver. 
Rather than focus on Cassius’s disposition toward Brutus’s crime, then, 
complicity law might look to his disposition toward Brutus’s criminal 
intention.41 If Brutus is blameworthy for having the criminal intention, Cassius 
                                                                                                                      
39. This stands for any case in which the helper intends that the crime occur. For exemplary 
cases, see supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
40. Again, this is one of the background assumptions of this Note, since it will be embodied by 
most legal systems focused enough on culpability to have accomplice liability at all. For brief 
discussion of this point, see supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text. 
41. By requiring a certain attitude on Cassius’s part toward Brutus’s criminal “intention,” I do 
not mean to suggest that accomplice liability should be limited to specific-intent crimes. My 
proposal can also cover crimes of recklessness or criminal negligence. Suppose that Brutus 
commits involuntary manslaughter while driving his chariot drunk (and hence recklessly). 
If Cassius, with similar recklessness toward human life, intends that Brutus intend to drive 
under such conditions, then he can be liable as an accomplice to Brutus’s involuntary 
manslaughter. In general, to be an accomplice on this account, one must intend that the 
principal form or keep his intention to engage in the relevant criminal conduct, whether the 
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might be similarly blameworthy for intending that Brutus adopt or keep this 
intention.42 Both might be to blame for insensitivity to the reasons against 
carrying out the criminal intention.  
This blameworthiness can be a proper target of criminal law, as we have 
seen, if retribution is central to justifying punishment. And retribution or 
something like it probably is central, if our complicity law itself makes sense.43 
From this normative angle, we can see why the law might care how Cassius 
regards Brutus’s intention. If Cassius intends to see to it that Brutus form or 
keep his own plan (his intention) to commit the offense, then Cassius intends 
Brutus’s guilty mind: the very aspect of Brutus’s act that makes Brutus worthy 
of criminal sanction at all.  
Usually this will be the case, but not always. Say Brutus is an elusive serial 
killer, long disposed to kill when expedient. Suppose, too, that Cassius wants 
him to form and manifest one last murderous intention (to kill Caesar) under 
just the right circumstances to be apprehended before more blood is spilled. 
Perhaps Cassius knows the guards are on patrol at Caesar’s palace. Or maybe 
he intends to call them over at the right moment. In either case, Cassius 
intends that Brutus form or keep a lethal plan, to be sure. But he expects or 
intends that it will not become the core of an act of murder—that Brutus’s 
malign mental state will not become a fully executed guilty mind. So he doesn’t 
show the insensitivity to the reasons against the crime’s commission that 
Brutus shows. (Brutus, of course, isn’t expecting his own intention to be 
thwarted.) As a result, we shouldn’t hold Cassius liable for Brutus’s very crime. 
This reinforces a potential difference between helper and principal made 
possible by the fact that they are, after all, separate people. Only the helper can 
coherently intend the principal’s intention while also intending or thinking it 
won’t be carried out. And that makes it possible for the helper not to be callous 
to the reasons against the crime’s commission. So our standard needs revising 
to exclude cases of this kind. Let Cassius satisfy the mens rea for complicity in 
Brutus’s crime if:  
                                                                                                                      
principal’s crime is one of intent, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence. I set aside strict-
liability crimes. 
42. It is more natural to speak of intending actions rather than states of affairs. But throughout 
this Note, “Cassius intends that Brutus form or keep his intention . . .” will be shorthand for 
“Cassius intends to see to it that Brutus form or keep his intention . . . .” It is a harmless 
shorthand: nothing crucial will turn on just what action constitutes “seeing to it.” 
43. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text. 
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1.   He intends that Brutus form or keep (however temporarily) an 
intention to commit the crime (“Supporting Intention 
Condition”). 
2.   He does not expect or intend that Brutus will fail to commit it 
(“Non-Failure Condition”). 
 Applying this test to our knife case, we can see that it passes. If Cassius 
intends for Brutus to murder Caesar, he can’t at the same time expect or intend 
for Brutus not to do so. And if he intends that Brutus commit murder, he must 
also intend that Brutus intend to murder. So this proposal includes all cases 
covered by the (unduly narrow) purpose view.  
But unlike that standard, this one is also satisfied in typical instances of the 
getaway case. There Cassius’s end—that Brutus pay him for an escape—
depends on Brutus’s intending (or, to some point, keeping his intention) to 
commit the crime requiring escape. The getaway example is, after all, what led 
us to formulate the Supporting Intention Condition. Yet as stated, it also meets 
the Non-Failure Condition.  
Casting Cassius in a variant of the getaway case will confirm that it meets 
the Supporting Intention Condition. If, days beforehand, Brutus wavered 
about going through with his plan, Cassius might encourage Brutus to keep it. 
Maybe he would wax on about how Caesar has become a despotic hoarder—
about how redistributing palace loot would do the whole realm some good. In 
any case, he is disposed to encourage Brutus; as a means to getting and keeping 
his fee, after all, Cassius intends that Brutus keep his intention to burgle, at 
least up to the point of no return for Brutus.44 Contrast all of this with 
Cassius’s attitude toward the burglary itself: If the burglary is threatened by 
the guards’ approach to the palace, Cassius will not adjust to make it succeed. 
He is not disposed to promote it. 
In the cashier case, by contrast, Cassius lacks even the intention that Brutus 
intend the crime. If Brutus wavered in his decision to use the hammer to break 
in, Cassius would not be disposed to try to get Brutus to keep that intention. 
By hypothesis, Cassius merely believes that Brutus intends to use the hammer 
for the break-in—which he is in no way disposed to promote.  
One might object that the cashier and getaway cases do not, after all, come 
out differently on my proposed criteria. According to this objection, either 
                                                                                                                      
44. This confirms that the Supporting Intention condition can be satisfied even where Brutus 
formed his criminal intention before Cassius came onto the scene. Cassius can still make a 
difference to Brutus’s keeping the intention, which is just as crucial to Cassius’s end. 
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Cassius must intend Brutus’s bad intention in both cases, or he needn’t in 
either. In the first, after all, Cassius aims to make money by selling Brutus the 
hammer, which he knows won’t happen unless Brutus has a purpose for it. So 
must Cassius not intend that Brutus retain his violent purpose? Of course, we 
might answer that Cassius need only intend that Brutus have some purpose for 
it, not necessarily a criminal one, and that this difference is what relieves him of 
complicity. But if Cassius-the-cashier is relieved on this ground, could Cassius-
the-getaway-driver not similarly plead that he only intends that Brutus have 
some chauffeuring needs, however innocent? If Brutus wavers about the 
burglary, could Cassius not keep his money by getting Brutus to hire a ride to 
the baths? 
As this discussion demonstrates, we can bend (or specify) the cases to make 
them converge. But as stated they will ordinarily differ in whether Cassius 
intends that Brutus have a criminal plan. Elaborating on both points will clarify 
my proposal.  
First, further evidence (of evil motives or the like) might show that 
Cassius-the-cashier does intend for Brutus to have a violent purpose for the 
hammer—one that, for all Cassius expects or intends, will be fulfilled. And 
then, on my proposal, Cassius would be liable as an accomplice. But that result 
seems right. After all, in this modified cashier scenario, Cassius stands ready to 
encourage a wavering Brutus to retain his violent purposes. That readiness 
should make a difference to Cassius’s blameworthiness, even if it finally makes 
no difference to his conduct.  
Why, then, do ordinary instances of the cashier and getaway cases seem to 
diverge? Perhaps the answer is this: The ratio of legitimate to illegitimate 
purposes that Cassius will think Brutus could practically have for a hammer is 
high.45 The same ratio with respect to a getaway ride—which Brutus must 
obtain in advance, secretly, and at great risk—is lower, and in absolute terms 
quite low. So in the getaway case it is likelier than not (and likelier than in the 
cashier case) that someone in Cassius’s position would intend, as a means to 
his end, that the other party form or keep a criminal plan.  
                                                                                                                      
45. Thus, as Weisberg notes, even courts applying the rule that purpose was required “would 
find: ‘such factors as the contraband quality of the article supplied and failure to report the 
sale, as legally required, sufficient to meet its demands.’” Weisberg, supra note 19, at  
238 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. at 317-18 (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1980)). 	
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In short, context gives evidence of what really matters for establishing 
complicity. The more crucial Cassius’s help is to a crime, and the less useful it 
is otherwise, the likelier it is that he intends Brutus’s criminal mind.  
These points make sense of the common idea that an ordinary business 
owner selling ordinary products to an apparently criminal customer should not 
be held complicit.46 If the business really is ordinary, then its owner’s 
contribution to the crime won’t likely be crucial. And ordinary products will 
probably have an ample range of licit uses. As the Supreme Court has observed 
in the related context of conspiracy liability, “[a]ll articles of commerce may be 
put to illegal ends,” and yet “all do not have inherently the same susceptibility 
to harmful and illegal use.”47 The nature of the product sold may suggest, 
indirectly, that the seller shares the buyer’s criminal purposes.48 
And, again, that sharing makes a difference. Cassius’s intention that Brutus 
intend to commit a violent crime, like a violent intention of his own, normally 
evinces a criminal’s insensitivity to the reasons against the violence that make it 
criminal.49 There are several ways of seeing this point and its relevance to 
complicity law.  
B.  Rationale 
The basic argument for this mens rea standard is that it best justifies doing 
just what accomplice liability remarkably does: holding the helper legally 
responsible for the very same crime as the perpetrator, even when he plays no 
actual role in causing it. The standard picks out cases where the helper 
identifies with what becomes the core of the principal’s own criminal act, 
without expecting or intending that it will not become such. He thus shows the 
kind of callousness toward the reasons against a crime for which we hold the 
principal liable: Both have identified with a criminal mens rea. Both stand 
ready to act on that identification (either by supporting or by carrying out the 
criminal intention). And neither expects or intends for it to be frustrated,50 
                                                                                                                      
46. For one defense of this intuition, see Mueller, supra note 19, at 2186-87. 
47. Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 710 (1943). 
48. See id. at 710-11; see also People v. Lauria, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628, 632 (Ct. App. 1967) (“Intent 
may be inferred from knowledge, when no legitimate use for the goods or services exists.”). 
49. It does this at least where the Non-Failure Condition is met—that is, where Cassius doesn’t 
intend or expect to see Brutus’s violent intention frustrated. 
50. Again, intending to do something is normally incompatible with believing one will not carry 
out one’s intention. Brutus cannot both intend to kill Caesar, and intend not to carry out his 
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though its execution depends on some factors beyond either agent’s control.51 
So it is fair to treat them the same, depending on what happens next: to 
convict both of the crime if it occurs, of attempt if it is thwarted once begun, or 
of nothing if it isn’t even attempted. To unpack this, I will show how each part 
of the standard contributes to picking out helpers who deserve much the same 
blame as those they help. 
Take the Supporting Intention Condition first. Intending something is a 
strong way of identifying with it. More than approval or merely knowing 
causation, intention is the paradigm form of willing.52 And, again, a criminal’s 
                                                                                                                      
goal (or believe that he will not). So principals will meet something like the Non-Failure 
Condition as applied to their own intentions: for all they expect or intend, their intention 
will be carried out.  
Moreover, it might be that intentions to form or keep the intention to X are reducible to 
simple, garden-variety intentions to X. (If Brutus can plan to plan to murder, is that any 
different from his just planning to murder?) It would then follow that principals also 
necessarily meet something like the Supporting Intention Condition as applied to 
themselves.  
If that is right, then we have a new way of formulating the argument for this mens rea 
standard for complicity—namely, that it isn’t, after all, a standard for complicity alone. It is a 
general mens rea standard of criminal liability. Anyone who meets it (and a relevant actus 
reus) should be held liable for the crime, full stop. It’s just that perpetrators necessarily meet 
it, while helpers only sometimes do. When they do, we call them “accomplices.”  
And then the distinction between perpetrator and accomplice—which makes no legal 
difference—will depend just on the sort of actus reus met, which makes no culpability 
difference. That result, too, makes sense given this Note’s stipulation that liability should 
turn most on culpability.  
51. What happens next isn’t entirely within the accomplice’s control. But neither is it entirely 
within the principal’s: whether Brutus commits murder or attempted murder will depend 
partly on outside factors, like whether Caesar gets away. And yet Brutus’s own liability 
hinges on such factors (since, for example, attempts are treated differently from completed 
crimes). So it isn’t obviously problematic to make Cassius’s degree of liability, too, depend 
on factors beyond his control, like whether the principal attempts the crime, completes it, or 
does nothing. For more on this, see infra Section V.C. 
52. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987) (“Deeply ingrained in our legal tradition is the 
idea that the more purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and, 
therefore, the more severely it ought to be punished.”). For a discussion of how intention 
identifies agents with choices and acts, see John Finnis, A Philosophical Case Against 
Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 23, 28-30 
(John Keown ed., 1995); and John Finnis, The Fragile Case for Euthanasia: A Reply to John 
Harris, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED, supra, at 46, 53-54. Why is intending the “paradigm” way 
of willing? There is a sense in which one “wills” whatever one knowingly causes, even as an 
unintended side effect. But intending something involves a deeper embrace than that. If I 
intend to kill someone, I adopt his death as a reason for my conduct. Not so if I just 
knowingly cause his death as a side effect of pursuing some other goal. 
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intention is not separate from his crime, but is rather—at least on the most 
complicity-friendly views of punishment53—an integral part of it, which helps 
explain his precise blameworthiness. Without this mens rea, his otherwise-
criminal act would not be the crime that it is, nor would it evince the same 
insensitivity to the reasons that make committing it unjust. In short, his 
culpability itself is part of the injustice, the unfairness, to be eradicated by 
criminal law, and culpability centers on a guilty mind. So to intend that 
someone have a criminal plan that might well become the core of a criminal act 
is to be willing to promote just the kind of social contaminant for which 
criminal law is (by hypothesis) the proper solvent.  
Concretely, if it is unjust for Brutus to kill, it is unjust for him to form the 
intention to kill. But then it should also be unjust for Cassius to intend to 
promote this intention in Brutus, unless he expects or intends for it to stop at 
Brutus’s mind—that is, for it not to be carried out. If it is unjust to promote an 
intention that, for all one intends or expects, will be carried out to harmful 
effect, why should it matter whether one does so by forming the intention 
oneself or supporting it in another? Of course, whether the murder happens 
will depend on some factors beyond Cassius’s control, but is the same not true 
of Brutus? 
To synthesize: Where the proposed mens rea is met, Cassius has identified 
himself with and willed what ultimately became—and what for all he expected 
or intended would become—an integral part of a criminal act. And if the 
essential core of Brutus’s criminal act is something that Cassius has identified 
with, it makes sense to hold him liable for it on a par with Brutus. After all, 
Cassius has shown something much like Brutus’s insensitivity to the reasons 
against Brutus’s crime. And if culpability is central to justifying criminal 
liability,54 then equal culpability can justify equal punishment.  
In fact, though, there is no guarantee that Cassius and Brutus will have 
exactly the same insensitivity to the reasons against Brutus’s crime. Perhaps 
Brutus is killing Caesar for sport, while Cassius regretfully intends that Brutus 
kill the emperor so that he (Cassius) can collect a bequest to keep his family 
from starving. There is then a range of possible degrees of callousness about 
murdering Caesar within which both Cassius and Brutus will fall: namely, 
                                                                                                                      
53. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text. 
54. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 156 (discussing retributivism’s tight link between culpability and 
liability); supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text (discussing the focus on culpability in legal 
systems amenable to accomplice liability); see also infra Section V.C (considering how such 
views could still take factors besides culpability into account when determining liability).  
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whatever range of such attitudes is compatible with ultimately deciding to seek 
his murder despite the countervailing reasons. But this is precisely the same 
range within which principals may be convicted of murder. So it makes sense to 
treat accomplices in this range like principals—which is just what the law of 
complicity does.55  
This analysis also shows that we shouldn’t stretch the Supporting 
Intention Condition to cover more cases. If Cassius, despite helping Brutus, 
does not intend that Brutus intend to kill, then he does not share 
blameworthiness for Brutus’s act. He does not support Brutus’s guilty mind, 
which is by hypothesis indispensable to the precise injustice that the criminal 
law aims to rectify. And if Cassius does not support the essential core of 
Brutus’s crime, it would be a mistake to count him an accomplice to Brutus’s 
very crime.56 As Sayre writes, “it is of the very essence of our deep-rooted 
notions of criminal liability that guilt be personal and individual.”57 The 
Supporting Intention Condition, then, is necessary. 
It is also sufficient—but only in combination with the Non-Failure 
Condition. As noted above, if Cassius intends that Brutus plan to burgle the 
palace but expects that Brutus will not—say, he expects Brutus to hit a 
roadblock—then Cassius might not evince the same insensitivity as Brutus to 
the reasons against the burglary. After all, he thinks it won’t happen.  
Even more clearly, Cassius is no accomplice if he intends for Brutus’s plan 
to be thwarted. Recall the case in which Cassius wants Brutus, an elusive serial 
killer, to form and somehow manifest another murderous plan (this time 
against Caesar), so that Cassius can turn him in before the killing. Cassius 
intends precisely that what he has promoted—Brutus’s intention—not become 
the core of an act of murder. So he certainly isn’t, like Brutus, insensitive to the 
harms of the murder. 
Note, finally, that this standard’s two conditions nicely align with the 
retributivist theories sketched in the Introduction. Those theories see curing 
injustice as the point of the criminal law. And the injustice in question is 
constituted by a guilty mind, expressed in conduct. Just so, the Supporting 
                                                                                                                      
55. At the same time, just as courts can adjust punishment for principals (within a range) on the 
basis of their role in the crime and differing levels of malice, so may they impose lesser 
punishments on accomplices in cases where they think the accomplices less malicious than 
those they help. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2 cmt. 4 (2012).  
56. Maybe Cassius should still be held liable for something else, like knowingly lending material 
support to a serious crime without a proportionate reason. See infra Section V.A. 
57. Francis Bower Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L. REV. 689, 717 
(1930). 
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Intention Condition and the Non-Failure Condition guarantee that what the 
accomplice intends to support is a guilty mind that (for all he knows or 
intends) will be expressed in action.58 
C.  Comparison with Traditional Rationales 
This standard provides a more solid basis for justifying the equal treatment 
of principals and accomplices. Traditionally, holding accomplices liable for the 
same crime as principals—quite apart from the particular mens rea standard 
used to do so—has been justified by appeal either to the rules of agency in civil 
law,59 or to the idea of forfeited personal identity.60 The justification just 
offered, which naturally fits my proposed mens rea standard, improves on both 
approaches.  
Civil agency “requires a party to consent to being subjected to the control 
of another.”61 Normally, of course, accomplices never actually consent to being 
liable for another’s crimes. If given a choice, who would? We might argue that 
“[b]y intentionally acting to further the criminal actions of another, the 
secondary party voluntarily identifies himself with the principal party,”62 but 
this approach faces two problems. First, it assumes just what needs 
argument—that aiding someone means consenting to liability for his actions.63 
And this is by no means self-evident, as suggested by the second problem: The 
theory would stretch criminal liability to grotesque proportions, to match civil 
liability under agency law. It would render an accomplice criminally liable for 
all the “natural and probable consequences” of the principal’s conduct.64  
                                                                                                                      
58. For more on why the guilty mind must be carried out, see infra Section V.C. 
59. See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 126 (2d ed. 1961) 
(discussing rules of agency where the accessory is not the promoter of the mischief). 
60. See Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability: New 
Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 111 (1985) (discussing the theory on which 
an accomplice “forfeits his or her personal identity”). 
61. Id. at 110 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1957)).  
62. Kadish, supra note 15, at 354. 
63. See Jacob Kreutzer, Note, Causation and Repentance: Reexamining Complicity in Light of 
Attempts Doctrine, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 155, 164 (2008). 
64. People v. Feagans, 480 N.E.2d 153, 159 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (“[W]hen one attaches himself to 
a group bent on illegal acts . . . he is accountable for the acts committed by the other 
members . . . as a natural and probable consequence thereof . . . .”); see also WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 939.05(2)(c) (West 2005) (holding an accomplice liable for any crime committed “in 
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This implication, though embraced in some jurisdictions, has been 
criticized as being generally “inconsistent with more fundamental principles of 
our system of criminal law.”65 Not only does it hold people criminally liable for 
acts they did not even think of; it also leads to convicting people of specific-
intent offenses who had no such intent. In both cases, it lets the state impose 
just the same criminal stigma, status, and punishment on the “implicitly 
consenting” helper as on the principal. And it does so even though “[d]eeply 
ingrained in our legal tradition is the idea that the more purposeful is the 
criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and, therefore, the more 
severely it ought to be punished.”66  
The same factors cut against a second common argument for accomplice 
liability: that by aiding a principal, an accomplice “forfeits her personal 
identity,” which then becomes bound up in the principal’s.67 This theory leads 
to the same over-inclusive results as the civil agency analogy.  
But it faces another problem, of more interest to theorists than would-be 
defendants. By treating the helper as “no more than an incorporeal shadow,”68 
it so effaces his autonomy as to undermine the theoretical foundations of 
accomplice liability. Someone functioning as a principal’s mere tool can hardly 
be liable for influencing him.69 The “forfeited personal identity” doctrine 
would thus undermine the very form of liability it tries to justify.  
By contrast, the standard examined here would tie the helper not to the 
principal but to his act—and not by some obscure or question-begging theory 
of implied consent, but by the central aspect of what ties the principal himself to 
the act for criminal liability: his willing it. This approach, in other words, 
coheres well with “the common law view . . . that one became responsible for 
another person’s crime by joining in it rather than by causing it.”70 Grounded on 
a fairer foundation, it avoids inculpating too many actors as accomplices. 
                                                                                                                      
pursuance of the intended crime and which under the circumstances is a natural and 
probable consequence of the intended crime”). 
65. LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 13.3(b), at 688.  
66. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987). 
67. Dressler, supra note 60, at 111. 
68. Id. 
69. Cf. id. at 116-17 (“Yet, it is precisely because the criminal justice system stigmatizes the guilty 
and metes out punishment for wrongdoing that the common law usually rejects forfeiture, 
and instead evaluates legal guilt and apportions punishment based on the degree of personal 
responsibility. . . . Rejection of the forfeiture doctrine makes it less likely that criminals will 
be treated inhumanely, or that rights perceived as fundamental will be denied.”).  
70. Weisberg, supra note 19, at 226. 
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iv.  concrete implications 
Here I consider how my proposal measures up against the law’s actual 
standards. First I consider the actus reus of accomplice liability, the defense of 
withdrawal, and the punishment to which accomplices may be subject. Then I 
consider which important decisions the proposal supports, which it would 
regard as questionable, and which it contradicts.  
A.  Fit with Other Features of Accomplice Liability 
The account I have offered makes sense of the wide scope of the actus reus 
for complicity, which can be satisfied by efforts to encourage the agent to 
commit the act, not just by physical facilitation.71 Indeed, that encouragement 
needn’t causally contribute to the aided crime. Fittingly, then, the proposed 
standard requires only that the helper promote the principal’s criminal 
intention, not necessarily its execution. More obviously than physical help, 
words of counsel or influence can support a criminal intention without making 
it likelier to be carried out successfully.72 So this standard fits these otherwise 
hard-to-explain points of complicity doctrine. 
It also fits rather snugly the defense of withdrawal or abandonment, 
provided for in the Model Penal Code and the statutes of a dozen states.73 
Section 2.06(6)(c) of the Model Penal Code offers a defense to one who 
“terminates his complicity prior to the commission of the offense and (i) 
wholly deprives it of effectiveness in the commission of the offense; or (ii) 
gives timely warning to the law enforcement authorities or otherwise makes 
proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense.”74 Someone covered by 
this defense has likely fallen short of the proposed mens rea standard, by 
                                                                                                                      
71. Thus, the federal accomplice liability statute provides that whoever “aids, abets, counsels, 
commands, induces, or procures” a crime’s commission is liable as a principal. 18 U.S.C.  
§ 2(a) (2012).  
72. For another way in which this proposal coheres with the actus reus of accomplice liability, 
see infra Section V.C. 
73. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §273(3) (2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-2(c)(3) 
(West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-10 (LexisNexis 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-
A, § 57(5)(C) (2007); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(6)(c) (Official Draft 1985). 
74. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(6)(c). 
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violating its Non-Failure Condition: he has intended that the principal’s 
intention be frustrated.75  
Finally, this account makes sense of the law’s allowing the same 
punishment—the same criminal conviction—for accomplices as for principals. 
Again, to intend that someone intend a crime (without intending or expecting 
that his intention will be thwarted) is to manifest the same type of insensitivity 
to the reasons against it as the principal has shown. 
B.  Fit with Case Law 
The standard defended here also fits the holdings of several major cases. It 
accounts for the ruling in United States v. Campisi,76 where a defendant was 
convicted of complicity in forgery for selling stolen bonds to someone who 
forged signatures on them. Campisi likely thought that buyers would not 
purchase the bonds unless they thought them useful, and that they would not 
think them useful unless signed (and thus fit for market exchange). So for 
Campisi to achieve his own goal of selling the bonds, he must have intended 
that his would-be buyer intend to forge signatures on them. At least, a 
factfinder could reasonably have inferred this from the context.77 And there is 
no evidence that Campisi expected (much less intended) that the buyer would 
be thwarted.  
The same goes for another case prominent in the literature, United States v. 
Scotti.78 At trial in that case, the court had issued a jury instruction possibly 
suggesting that a mortgage broker could be guilty of extortion just for 
knowingly helping a loan shark’s victim to secure the money to pay him back. 
The Second Circuit affirmed a decision79 rejecting that instruction—a result 
supported by my proposed mens rea standard. For all we know from the 
record, the broker did not stand to gain from the extortionate loan’s provision, 
nor from the loan shark’s criminal intention to provide it. So the record does 
                                                                                                                      
75. This would certainly be true of someone who warned law enforcement (prong (ii) of the 
defense); it would be reasonable to infer about someone who tried to reverse any effect of 
his help (prong (i)). 
76. 306 F.2d 308, 309 (3d Cir. 1962). 
77. Note that even if the would-be buyer made someone else produce the false signature, he 
would be liable as an accomplice to forgery, and hence liable for forgery (not just its 
solicitation), so long as the signatures were indeed produced.  
78. 47 F.3d 1237 (2d Cir. 1995). 
79. United States v. Rodriguez, No. CR 92-1061, 1993 WL 534314 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1993). 
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not justify inferring that he met the Supporting Intention Condition—that he 
intended that the loan shark form or keep his criminal intention. He need only 
have intended that, the loan having been made, its victim escape the risks of 
not repaying it.80  
More ambiguous is the famous decision in United States v. Peoni.81 In that 
case, Joseph Peoni had sold counterfeit dollar bills to Regno, who sold them to 
Dorsey. And Dorsey’s resulting possession of the counterfeit bills was itself an 
offense. The question was whether this made Peoni an accomplice to Dorsey’s 
possession. The answer was no, according to Judge Learned Hand’s opinion. 
As an initial matter, it is implausible that Peoni could have intended anything 
but a criminal intention on Regno’s part (i.e., to possess counterfeit bills). If 
Regno lacked this intention, after all, he would not have sought the bills from 
Peoni. But could Peoni expect Regno himself to seek to possess the bills 
without also seeking to pass them on? (Is there any other goal that Regno 
might have had in trying to get the bills?) And if not, didn’t Peoni have to 
intend that Regno plan to pass those bills along, which in turn required that 
someone else (here, Dorsey) intend to possess them?  
Maybe at some point the transactions become so distant, fade so much into 
the practical horizon, that Peoni cannot be expected to have had any stance 
toward them. How my proposal disposes of this case will depend on whether 
Peoni actually had a certain stance toward Dorsey’s plans. The court seems to 
acquit him on the ground that he probably didn’t: “[Peoni] ought not to be 
tried for [conveying counterfeit bills] wherever the prosecution may pick up 
any guilty possessor—perhaps thousands of miles away.”82  
Finally, my account definitely rules out cases that impose accomplice 
liability for mere knowledge of the link between aid and crime.83 But this is a 
welcome departure from the current (and conflicted) doctrine.84  
                                                                                                                      
80. For Yaffe, the Court reached the right decision here if it turns out that the broker “refrained 
from representing the act as helpful to the loan shark in the intention that guided his 
behavior. . . and so lack[ed] a commitment of non-reconsideration with respect to the 
crime.” Yaffe, supra note 31, at 28. Did he form this intention but somehow avoid being 
thereby disposed to promote the loan shark’s crime? Or did he form an intention simply to 
help the victim, while knowing that this would help the loan shark? I find it hard to tell the 
difference—not just from the Court’s perspective, but from the broker’s. For discussion of 
problems of this kind, see supra Subsection II.B.2. 
81. 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938). 
82. Id. at 403. 
83. For such cases, see supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.  
84. For criticism of the knowledge standard, see supra Section II.A. 
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v.  objections 
I will end by considering objections to my account, based on alternatives 
dominant in the literature and case law. 
A.  A Single Standard?  
I have assumed that whatever the mens rea standard for complicity is, it 
must pick out the same stance toward the aided crime, regardless of how grave 
the crime might be or how extensive the aid. I have not considered views on 
which the required mental state varies based on these other factors.  
And yet a helper does seem to be more blameworthy the more serious the 
crime he aids and the more extensive his aid. Someone might be just as 
culpable for, say, (a) contributing greatly to a crime that he merely foresees, as 
for (b) contributing little to a similar crime that he intends for the principal to 
commit. If punishment should track culpability, why not treat the helper as an 
accomplice in (a) as well as (b), despite the difference in his attitudes toward 
the aided crime? Some courts have indeed moved to applying a disjunctive 
mens rea requirement for complicity.85  
But doing so is, first, unnecessary, because the law has tools besides 
accomplice liability for punishing those who aid major crimes. For example, if 
Cassius gives Brutus resources that he just believes Brutus will use for 
terrorism, Cassius is liable not for complicity in the terrorist crime, but for a 
distinct crime with its own punishment schedule: lending terrorists material 
support.86 Such alternatives remove the main motive for letting a range of 
mental states count for complicity in the worst crimes—namely, the concern to 
avoid treating equally culpable helpers differently. 
                                                                                                                      
85. For example, Weiss reads Campisi as follows:  
Campisi’s view of Peoni is that rather than establishing the purposeful intent 
standard in all instances of aiding and abetting liability, Peoni generally retains 
knowledge as the appropriate standard. It imposes the higher purposeful intent 
standard only in cases where the connection of the aider and abettor to the 
principal is too remote for liability on a lesser standard.  
  Weiss, supra note 2, at 1399. Likewise, Judge Posner has held that “there is support  
for relaxing [what he takes as the usually applicable knowledge] requirement [for complicity] 
when the crime is particularly grave.” United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 798 (7th  
Cir. 1985).  
86. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012) (criminalizing the conduct of “knowingly providing material 
support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization” (emphasis added)).  
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Of course, something might be unnecessary but still convenient. What 
reasons counsel against a disjunctive standard? Recall that anything sufficient 
for complicity must suffice for liability not just for some wrongdoing, nor even 
for some crime, but for the same crime, with the same resulting status and 
disabilities. There are many cases in which helpers who do not satisfy the 
Supporting Intention Condition might not be just as blameworthy; and cases 
where they are (because the aided crimes are especially heinous) can, again, be 
covered by criminalizing facilitation.87 This means that expanding the mens rea 
standard would do some harm, and do no good that couldn’t be achieved by  
other means. 
So limiting complicity to the mental state described here is not only 
conceptually cleaner but more just, without imposing greater costs. No one 
needs to go unpunished just because he fails to meet my proposed unitary 
mens rea standard. By contrast, if that standard is expanded, some who do not 
deserve conviction of the very same act may well be subjected to it. There is 
therefore no special reason to make the mens rea standard disjunctive (as 
opposed to separately criminalizing certain kinds of facilitation). And there is 
some reason to keep it to one attitude. So we should. 
And we do. At common law and under the Model Penal Code, for example, 
the accomplice can’t be liable for a more serious crime than the principal, even 
if he is more culpable (say, because he tries to do great damage by encouraging 
the principal in a petty offense). The reason, again, is that we must be able to 
attribute to the accomplice the very same act, not just any equally blameworthy 
one. The accomplice is in this sense like a coauthor of a crime. And it would be 
odd if the standard for whether (or how much) one has authored an act varied 
by its moral gravity. After all, no one thinks that a man acting alone is more an 
author of his felonies than of his (equally voluntary and premeditated) 
misdemeanors. 
It would also be odd if the extent of one’s authorship depended on the 
extent of one’s behavioral participation just as such: someone acting alone is 
not more the author of his acts, the more extensive the behaviors required to 
perform them, even apart from any differences in mental states. 
If, on the other hand, “extent” of participation meant proportion of causal 
contribution to the act’s commission, then it would be too much a matter of 
degree to determine a binary relation to the act (i.e., that of 
coauthor/accomplice or not). And it would be inversely related to the number 
of co-defendants, which contradicts intuitions and practice; liability is not 
                                                                                                                      
87. Mueller, supra note 19, at 2186. 
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divided as helpers multiply. For all these reasons, we should let only one kind 
of attitude ground accomplice liability. 
B.  Under-inclusive?  
Of course, my proposal might be under-inclusive not because its standard 
is uniform, but because it is simply too high. Here I address four cases of 
apparent accomplice liability that my theory might seem to miss. 
First, suppose that Cassius wants Caesar dead, and goes to his palace with a 
knife to do the deed. On arrival, he sees that Brutus is about to kill Caesar 
himself but that Calpurnia might interfere. So Cassius kills Calpurnia to free 
Brutus up to kill Caesar. Brutus stabs, and Caesar falls. Clearly, Cassius is an 
accomplice in the imperial assassination. But does he slip beneath the bar set by 
my proposal? In particular, does Cassius fail to meet the Supporting Intention 
Condition? Maybe he does not intend that Brutus intend to kill Caesar. Maybe 
he merely intends to kill Caesar himself. 
I disagree. All along in the scenario, Cassius has the ultimate goal that 
Caesar die. At first, he forms the intention to kill Caesar himself as a means to 
that end. But our intended means often shift in light of new information. 
When he arrives and sees what is happening, Cassius shifts to intending that 
Brutus kill Caesar as Brutus had planned. This is, in any case, the best way to 
make sense of Cassius’s killing Calpurnia: it is intended as a means of bringing 
about Caesar’s death, but could only be such if it frees Brutus of Calpurnia. So 
Cassius must ultimately intend (as a means) that Brutus kill Caesar—and 
hence, that Brutus keep his own intention to do so. The Supporting Intention 
Condition is satisfied after all. 
This apparent counterexample highlights an important point. One can have 
goals that one would, in some respect, regret seeing fulfilled, or that one 
regrets needing to have at all. But this is nothing new: many surely regret the 
financial cost of fulfilling their dream of studying law; parents might regret 
needing to have a plan for punishing a child if she misbehaves.  
These possibilities bring us to a second apparent counterexample. Cassius 
tells Brutus: “You shouldn’t go through with your planned burglary; it’s 
wrong. But assuming you will, you’ll need to hire a chariot driver for the 
getaway, and it might as well be me, so that I can make some money.” As we 
have just seen, one can have an intention that one would (in some way) regret 
to see fulfilled. So Cassius’s desire that Brutus not kill does not ensure that he 
(Cassius) fails the Supporting Intention Condition. Still, he might seem to fall 
short of satisfying that condition; yet it seems clear that he should count as an 
accomplice anyway.  
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In addressing this kind of case, it helps to fill in some details. For instance, 
maybe it’s only up to a point that Cassius intends that Brutus abandon his 
criminal intention. And once he’s begun making the risky preparations to help, 
Cassius switches to intending that Brutus keep his intention so that his risk 
pays off. Then here, as in the first apparent counterexample, Cassius ultimately 
satisfies the Supporting Intention Condition.  
But what if Cassius claims that he never intended that Brutus form or keep 
his criminal plan? Maybe he says that he was indifferent all along, or even that 
he intended—till the end—that Brutus drop his intention. 
Take the first of these cases: Cassius pleads perfect indifference. Here, I 
suspect, most of us (and most courts) would be inclined to find complicity 
simply because we would disbelieve Cassius. If a minimally rational person 
positions himself to benefit from something’s occurring, and does so despite 
great risk and steep moral cost, he will be disposed to intend whatever must 
happen for him to get the benefit. 
As for the second case, Cassius’s providing the getaway ride while doing 
nothing to thwart the crime suggests that he does not, in fact, intend that Brutus 
drop his intention. Someone who has an intention and an opportunity to carry 
it out will do so unless he is thwarted or changes his mind.88 Yet if Cassius 
drives the escape chariot for Brutus’s burglary, it is safe to think (absent 
contrary evidence) that he had some opportunity to discourage or thwart the 
crime. His failure even to try is thus evidence that he was not disposed to try—
that he did not intend for Brutus to change his mind. Our intuitions about 
motivational psychology make us suspect that Cassius really did satisfy the 
Supporting Intention Condition.  
 The same would be true, I suspect, if Cassius (in a prescient attempt to 
avoid this Note’s Non-Failure Condition) took only feeble and ineffectual steps 
to stop Brutus. Most juries would probably see such steps as pretextual. Or at 
least, they would judge their authenticity in light of the opportunities that 
Cassius had to thwart or discourage Brutus. Someone who really intends to 
stop a crime will take what he reasonably considers sufficient steps for doing so, 
within the limits of his opportunities. This seems just a natural extension of 
the Means Norm described in Part II, which holds that one who intends to do 
something and has the opportunity will, unless prevented, do it. Given the 
                                                                                                                      
88. In particular, Yaffe defends the following principle: “If (1) from t1 to t2 D has the ability and 
the opportunity to C and does not fall prey to ‘execution failure,’ and (2) D does not (at least 
until after t2) change his mind, then D would C.” GIDEON YAFFE, ATTEMPTS: IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 94 (2010). 
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chance, it would be just as irrational not to take what we considered sufficient 
action toward a goal, as to do nothing about it at all.  
C.  Incompatible with the Actus Reus Requirement or Derivative Nature of 
Accomplice Liability? 
On the account sketched here, the basis for imposing accomplice liability is 
that if the helper has a certain mental state, he exhibits much the same 
insensitivity to the reasons against the crime as the principal. One might object 
that this justification focuses so much on intentions that it can’t explain either 
the need for an actus reus, or the law’s longstanding predication of complicity 
on the principal’s crime having actually occurred.89 If Cassius satisfies the 
Supporting Intention Condition and the Non-Failure Condition regarding 
Brutus’s crime, how can Cassius’s blameworthiness depend on whether he has 
yet taken concrete steps to help or encourage Brutus, or on whether Brutus 
finally acts?  
It probably can’t, if by “blameworthiness” we mean the state of Cassius’s 
moral character. Once he has decided to offer Brutus encouragement, Cassius’s 
character is hardly worse just after the resulting sound waves pass through his 
lips than just before. His moral character also seems unaffected by whether 
Brutus finally manages to carry out his intention. Yet under our law, either 
factor can affect whether Cassius is an accomplice. Does this undercut a basic 
assumption of my account90—that what most justifies imposing accomplice 
liability is the helper’s culpability? 
Not necessarily. Several considerations might justify requiring an actus 
reus before imposing any criminal liability, while allowing us to base the kind 
of conviction just on culpability. 
Some take overt acts to be indispensable evidence of a guilty mind. Building 
on this point, some see banning mental states as beyond the law’s competence 
because (they argue) it is bound to be ineffective: absent behavioral evidence, 
the accused could always just deny having had the forbidden thought. Or 
perhaps banning thoughts is immoral (say, because freedom of thought is 
inherently valuable).91  
                                                                                                                      
89. See Kadish, supra note 15, at 355-56. 
90. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text. 
91. See Herbert Morris, Punishment for Thoughts, 49 MONIST 342, 365 (1965); cf. JOHN AUSTIN, 
LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 441 (Robert Campbell ed., 5th ed. 2005) (1885) (“Where a 
criminal intention is evidenced by an attempt, the party is punished in respect of the 
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It is beyond this Note’s scope to assess or compare these rationales. What 
matters is that for each of them, the problem is criminalizing pure mental 
states. None gives us any more direction than that. Once we are beyond the 
realm of purely “mental” offenses, none tells us whether (or how much) to give 
weight to an offense’s behavioral features in imposing liability. None would 
undermine the premise of my account that once criminal liability is justified at 
all, it is features of the helper’s mental state that will (or won’t) justify 
imposing accomplice liability. 
And again, that premise seems right by our law’s lights for this reason: any 
actus reus that might possibly contribute to the principal’s crime is enough for 
the actus reus of complicity. So it can hardly be the actus reus in which 
complicity law takes much interest. As we have seen,92 that actus reus need not 
be prohibited in itself. It needn’t cause the principal’s crime. In fact, it needn’t 
cause one iota of harm.93 So while preventing harmful conduct may be of 
greater interest in other areas (e.g., principal liability for murder), here the act 
element must be doing no more than the minimal work that it does across the 
penal code—evidentiary, moral, or otherwise.  
The second question is related: Can this culpability-focused account 
explain why our law has traditionally held accomplices liable only where the 
principals have gone through with their crimes? 
                                                                                                                      
criminal intention . . . . Why the party should be punished in respect of a mere intention, I 
will try to explain hereafter. The reason for requiring an attempt is probably the danger of 
admitting a mere confession. When coupled with an overt act, the confession is illustrated 
and supported by the latter. When not, it may proceed from insanity, or may be invented by 
the witness to it.”); Gerald Dworkin & David Blumenfeld, Punishment for Intentions, 75 
MIND 396, 396-404 (1966) (examining moral arguments against punishing people just for 
evil intentions). See generally YAFFE, supra note 88, 215-36 (discussing possible justifications 
for a conduct requirement). 
92. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text. 
93. Cf. J.W.C. Turner, Attempts to Commit Crimes, in MODERN APPROACH TO CRIMINAL LAW 273, 
277-78 (Leon Radzinowicz & J.W.C. Turner eds., 1945) (“The important point is, however, 
that the actus reus in attempt need not be forbidden in itself. It follows, therefore, that 
whereas in most crimes it is the actus reus, the harmful result, which the law desires to 
prevent, while the mens rea is only the necessary condition for the infliction of punishment 
on the person who has produced the harmful result, in attempt the position is reversed, and 
it is the mens rea which the law regards as of primary importance and desires to prevent, 
while a sufficient actus reus is the necessary condition for the infliction of punishment on the 
person who has formed that criminal intent. . . . If then, in attempt, the sole purpose of the 
actus reus is to establish criminal liability for the existence of mens rea, it is necessary to 
decide . . . what will be a sufficient actus reus.”).  
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Assuming that a good theory must explain this feature,94 there may be 
rationales consistent with my account. Recall from Section III.A that if a 
person meets my proposed standard, he has identified himself with what 
ultimately became (and what for all he intended or expected would become) an 
integral part of a criminal act. But this condition applies only where what he 
intends—the principal’s own intention—becomes part of a real commission by 
the principal. 
If Cassius fulfills the Supporting Intention Condition and the Non-Failure 
Condition with respect to Brutus’s crime, then Cassius and Brutus both 
identify with the criminal mens rea, take some active steps toward either 
supporting or carrying it out, and do not expect or intend for it to fail to be 
carried out. In these ways, both mental and behavioral, they are similarly 
situated toward the crime before its completion. They have both contributed 
behaviorally to a crime whose guilty mind they share, though its execution 
depends on some factors beyond their control. And so, as seen in Section III.B, 
we may treat them the same: as guilty of the crime if it occurs, of its attempt if 
thwarted midway, or otherwise of nothing. The law does just that. 
Of course, a purist about culpability might still reject the complicity 
doctrines discussed in this Section, on the ground that they wrongly make 
liability hinge at all on something besides blameworthiness.95 Someone 
concerned only with culpability might thus take issue with (a) punishing 
accomplices when the principals’ crimes finally occur but not at all where they 
do not, or (b) punishing them less when the principals’ crimes are just 
attempted. But the same concern—that liability should vary only by 
culpability—would tell every bit as much against (a’) the law’s refusal to 
punish principals whose intentions are never carried out, and (b’) its mitigation 
of punishment for principals’ mere attempts.  
After all, under my proposed mens rea standard, principal and 
accomplice—whom the law treats alike—will be alike when it comes to 
culpability. So if that standard is applied, culpability-based objections to the 
                                                                                                                      
94. The importance of explaining it is at least waning; many courts and jurisdictions are 
beginning to abandon the requirement that the crime actually occur before accomplice 
liability is imposed. See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-2(c)(2) (West 2005); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 57(3)(A) (2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.041.2(2) (2011). See generally 
Weiss, supra note 2 (noting jurisdictions that have abandoned this requirement).  
95. Recall that this Note assumes that the link between culpability and liability should be quite 
strong. Otherwise it would be hard to justify the features of accomplice liability that the 
Note takes for granted in its search for the best mens rea standard. See supra notes 5-9 and 
accompanying text. 
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contours of accomplice liability should put equal pressure on the shape of 
principal liability; there should be no special problem with complicity law. 
Either the questioned features should be reshaped across criminal law, or the 
purist’s exclusive focus on culpability (and hence, perhaps, accomplice liability 
as we know it) should be rejected. 
conclusion 
Striking in scope and consequence, accomplice liability marks our criminal 
law’s most flamboyant reliance on culpability. To supporters, it may be the 
purest expression of the principle that injustice is not exhausted by injuries to 
people or property but includes the guilty minds that lead to these. To skeptics, 
it may be our riskiest wager on the idea that the social disorder that we may set 
right by law extends to disorder in the criminal’s mind.  
Without taking a position on this feature of our law but taking it for 
granted, I have attempted to address complicity doctrine’s oldest dispute while 
keeping its basic shape. If we are ever justified in imposing accomplice liability, 
it will be where the helper has the same kind of blameworthiness as the 
principal. And he will have that if he meets the mental state requirement 
proposed here: he will have identified with what became the core of the 
principal’s own criminal act, without expecting or intending that the crime not 
come to pass. 
But the great if looming over this Note points to deeper questions: Should 
we hold accomplices so liable? Is culpability quite so central to justifying 
punishment? Maybe the long conflict addressed here cannot be chalked up to 
the complexities of criminal psychology alone. Maybe it reflects enduring 
ambivalence about more basic questions of punishment and justice—questions 
that will far outlast this controversy, just as they were raised by Plato  
before Peoni.  
 
